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INTRODUCTION 
This article is based on my presentation at California Western 
International Law Journal’s Symposium on “Indigenous Communities 
in the Modern Economy: The Struggle for Land Rights in Israel and the 
United States.”  My presentation focused on the Bedouin land rights 
issue in Israel.  Based on the current legal situation, litigating Bedouin 
land cases in the national courts will not result in recognition of 
Bedouin land rights.  This article proposes customary law as the basis 
for recognizing Bedouin land rights.  Therefore, this article presents and 
analyzes similar cases around the world, mainly in Australia, Canada, 
South Africa, and Nicaragua to seek a solution for indigenous land 
rights. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Bedouin in the Negev—a desert region occupying nearly 4,700 
square miles—are Palestinian Arab citizens of the State of Israel.1 They 
are the indigenous inhabitants of the Negev.2 There are 1.8 million 
                                                          
1.  Negev Desert Region, Israel, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Negev (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
2.  See Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land: The Bedouin Case in Israel, 34 J. JURIS. 333, 348-49 (2017) 
[hereinafter Role of the Judiciary]. 
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Palestinian Arabs in Israel, constituting twenty percent of Israel’s 
population.3 The Bedouin population is about 230,000 which makes up 
approximately twelve percent of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.4 
Half of the Bedouin of the Negev live in seventeen recognized 
townships and the other half live in thirty-five unrecognized villages.5 
II. LAND EXPROPRIATION 
Land has been the center of State policy toward the Negev Bedouin; 
a policy that continues discriminating and depriving the Bedouin people 
of their basic rights.  Therefore, land expropriation has been a central 
component of the State of Israel’s policy toward the Bedouin.  
Interestingly, the state’s policy toward the Bedouin is epitomized in the 
following quotation from Moshe Dayan, who was at the time in charge 
of the Department of Agriculture: 
We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat in 
industry, services, construction and agriculture.  88% of the Israeli 
populations are not farmers; let the Bedouins be like them.  Indeed, 
this would be a radical move which means that the Bedouin would 
not live in this land with his herds but would become an urban person 
who comes home in the afternoon and put his slippers on . . . the 
children would go to school with their hair properly combed.  This 
would be a revolution, but it may be fixed within two generations. 
Without coercion but with government direction . . . this 
phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear.  Moshe Dayan, Haaretz 
interview, 31 July 1963.6 
This quote directly highlights the government’s intent in erasing any 
trace of Bedouin tradition or culture—Israel’s state policy would have 
the Bedouin completely assimilate. 
                                                          
3.  Press Release, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Population of Israel on the 
Eve of 2018 - 8.8 Million (Dec. 31, 2017) (on file with author). 
4.  Elsana, Role of Judiciary, supra note 2, at 337. 
5.  Morad Elsana, The Dispossession and Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights-The Case of Bedouin in Israel, AM. UNIV. 43, 49 (2013) [hereinafter 
Dispossession and Recognition]. 
6.  Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel, 30 
LAW & SOC. REV. 231, 231-57 (1996). 
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Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, wrote to his 
eleven-year-old son before the birth of the Jewish state: “Negev land is 
reserved for Jewish citizens whenever and wherever they want.  We 
must expel the Arabs and take their place.”7 
According to a British mandate list, Bedouins occupied about 
12,600,000 dunams8 in the Negev in 1937.9 Today the Bedouin struggle 
to avoid eviction from the remaining 240,000 dunams left to them.10 
Although Bedouin land rights and tribal boundaries were respected by 
Ottoman and British authorities, and the subsequent British Mandate 
authorities, Israel rejects any land rights for the Negev Bedouin. 
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, approximately eighty to ninety 
percent of the Bedouins were driven out of their villages.11 From the 
70,000 to 90,000 Bedouin population in the late 1940s, by 1951, fewer 
than 13,000 Bedouins remained.12 As late as 1953, the United Nations 
reported the expulsion of approximately 7,000 Bedouin into adjacent 
areas of Jordan, Egyptian-occupied Gaza, and the Sinai.13 
After the 1948 war, the State placed the Bedouin (like the rest of 
the Palestinian Arabs) under martial law for about eighteen years, until 
1966.14 During that time the State’s military leadership began to initiate 
                                                          
7.  Abu Saad, The Palestinian Bedouin in the Negev, in NUR MASALHA, 
CATASTROPHE REMEMBERED: PALESTINE, ISRAEL AND THE INTERNAL REFUGEES: 
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD W. SAID 113, 120 (2005). 
8.  A dunam is about a quarter acre.  
9.  PENNY MADDRELL, THE BEDOUIN OF THE NEGEV 5 (Minority Rights Group 
Rep. No.81 1990). 
10.  Arab Ass’n for Hum. Rts. Fact-Sheet on the Naqab (Negev), COALITION 
AGAINST ISRAELI APARTHEID, https://www.caiaweb.org/old-site/files/AAHRA-
negev.factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
11.  See Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 338. This point is very 
controversial. Whether the departure was or was not voluntary depends on the 
affiliation of the historian. Many non-Zionist scholars (such as Elan Pappe and 
Palestinian scholars) insist that the Bedouin (as part of the Palestinians) were forced 
to leave their villages, while Zionist scholars and the official view of the State of Israel 
claim that the Bedouin left by their free will.  
12.  Jonathan Cook, Bedouin in the Negev Face New “Transfer,” MIDDLE EAST 
RESEARCH AND INFO. PROJECT (May 10, 2003), https://www.merip.org/ 
mero/mero051003. 
13.  Id. 
14.  See Ghazi Falah, How Israel Controls the Bedouin in Israel, 14 J. OF 
PALESTINE STUD. 35, 41 (1985); see Rudolfo Stavenhagen & Ahmad Amara, 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples and the Naqab Bedouin Arabs, in 
4
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plans for the Negev Bedouin.  Some of these plans included forcing 
Bedouins to settle in a very small area in the Negev.15 Under this policy, 
the State rounded up the remaining Bedouin in an enclosure area called 
the Siyag.16 During this period, the State also enacted several laws to 
dispossess the Bedouin of their lands.17 
A. Sedentarization Policy and Land Expropriation 
In the decades following the 1948 war, Israel sought 
“sedentarization,” forcing Bedouins away from their traditional 
lifestyles as farmers.  Israeli governments worked relentlessly to make 
the Bedouin “disappear.”18 The Bedouin who had not been evicted or 
fled during the War were “transferred” in the 1950s, either to the center 
of the country or to the “Siyag zone.” Those who were transferred to 
the center of the country went to the towns of Lod and Ramleh, where 
many worked as low-wage manual laborers.  The “Siyag zone” 
consisted of a small area close to the town of Be’er Sheva, in the 
northern Negev.19 
Since the mid-1960s, the State has classified Bedouin villages in 
the Negev as “scattered” communities or tribes and pressured the 
inhabitants to give up their traditional lifestyles as farmers and 
shepherds.  The State has offered to move the Bedouin from their 
villages to one of seven townships created in the 1970s.20 Half of the 
Bedouin in the Negev now live in these townships, where they languish 
at the bottom of every socio-economic index.  Since moving the 
Bedouin, Israel has enacted several laws to dispossess the Bedouin of 
their traditional lands.  In addition, they are unable to build or develop 
                                                          
INDIGENOUS (IN)JUSTICE: HUM. RTS L. AND BEDOUIN ARABS IN THE NAQAB/NEGEV 
182 (Ahmad Amara et al. eds., 2013). 
15.  See generally Arnon Medzini, Bedouin Settlement Policy in Israel: Success 
or Failure?, HORIZONS IN GEOGRAPHY, 37,  38 (2012); see SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL 
HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL GOV’T POL’Y TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 
16 (2006). 
16.  Id. at 16-17. “Siyag” is a Hebrew word meaning fence. 
17.  See George Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV., 467, 520-21 (1994). 
18.  Cook, supra note 12, at ¶ 6. 
19.  See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 15, at 17. 
20.  See id. at 52. 
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their new communities in any way—their homes are subject to 
demolition on a daily basis.21 
This policy’s purpose was to concentrate the Bedouin in small 
townships and make their traditional lands available for settlement 
programs—exclusively for Jews.  Further, the policy aims to 
domesticate the indigenous Bedouin and create a cheap source of labor 
for the Jewish economy.22 The process of urbanization into townships 
has been forced on the Bedouin in a manner insensitive to their culture 
and traditional livelihood.  Consequently, tensions have been very high 
between the State and the Bedouin regarding land ownership. 
As part of this policy, Israel has refused to recognize the Bedouin 
villages and their historical land rights.  This refusal is highlighted by 
Israel’s policy of house demolition and crop destruction, which forces 
Bedouins to leave their villages.23 As a result of this policy, about 
40,000 Bedouin houses in the Negev are labeled as illegal houses and 
subject to a constant threat of demolition.24 This forces most villagers 
to live in tents or metal shacks that are far from adequate housing 
structures.25 
B. House Demolitions 
House demolitions and evictions are among the insidious methods 
the State has been using to pressure the Bedouin to leave their 
traditional villages and move to the townships.26 The Planning and 
Construction Law of 1965 permits the State to designate all traditional 
Bedouin village housing  as illegal buildings and therefore subject to 
                                                          
21.  Id. at 59, 68, 78. 
22.  Id. at 15-17. 
23.  See generally Ben Fargeon & Michal Rotem, Enforcing Distress: House 
Demolition Policy in the Bedouin Community in the Negev, NEGEV COEXISTENCE F. 
FOR CIV. EQUALITY 32 (June 2016), https://www.dukium.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/HDR_2016_ENG-1.pdf. 
24.  Hezki Ezra, New Negev Town Plan Kiboshed by Illegal Bedouins, ARUTZ 
SHEVA (Nov. 26, 2015).  
25.  See Alexandre Capron and Sarra Grira, The Beginning of the End for 
Israel’s Negev Bedouin Culture?, THE OBSERVERS (June 17, 2013), 
http://observers.france24.com/en/20130717-end-israel-negev-bedouin-culture.  
26.  Fargeon & Rotem, supra note 24, at 32. 
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/4
Elsana camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:26 AM 
2018] THE CASE OF BEDOUIN LAND IN ISRAEL 67 
demolition.27 To speed up the abovementioned sedentarization process, 
the government created the Markovitz Commission on unlicensed 
buildings in 1986, which recommended the demolition of 6,601 
Bedouin homes in the Negev.28 Subsequent governments have 
maintained this policy.  Consequently, when a new construction is built 
and discovered, the owner is served with an administrative order to 
demolish the house.29 If the owner fails to do so, he is criminally 
prosecuted for constructing an unlicensed building.30 
This policy turns homeowners into criminal defendants and makes 
the Bedouin history of land ownership irrelevant.  Following the 
Markovitz Commission recommendation, Defendants are penalized 
with exceptionally high fines, equal to double the illegal house’s 
value.31 Adding insult to dehumanizing injury, the Bedouin are made 
to pay the costs of the demolition of their homes.32 After demolition, 
the State does not provide any resources or alternative housing.33 
Bedouins do not receive any social help, and the families are left 
without any shelter.  Contrary to the most basic standards of human 
decency, most of the houses were demolished without giving people 
even the time to remove their furniture and belongings. 
According to the Israeli Interior Ministry in 2004, the government 
designated about 42,000 houses in the Negev for demolition—all 
belonging to the Bedouin people.34 For example, in 2016, Israeli 
authorities demolished more than 1,000 Bedouin houses.35 Hundreds of 
house demolition cases are currently being prosecuted or pending in 
                                                          
27.  Id. at 7-8. 
28.  Arab Association for Human Rights Fact-Sheet on the Naqab (Negev), 
supra note 10. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Planning and Building Law, 5725-1965, SH NO. 467, p. 381-82  art. 204, 
205, 206, 207, 238a. (ISR.). 
31.  See id. at art. 48. 
32.  See id. at art. 218. 
33.  See generally id. 
34.  Silvia Boarini, In Pictures: Bedouin Face Israeli Demolitions, AL JAZEERA 
(May 9, 2014). https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2014/03/pictures-
bedouin-face-israeli—2014325125550140624.html. 
35.  See Record of House Demolitions and Crop Destruction - 2016, NEGEV 
COEXISTENCE F. FOR CIV. EQUALITY, https://www.dukium.org/record-house-
demolitions-crop-destruction-2016/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018). 
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courts.  These figures do not include those houses demolished by the 
owners themselves, after being threatened by the authorities. 
C. Economy and Government 
On an economic level, Bedouins living in recognized townships are 
poor and deprived of basic services.  However, Bedouins living in 
unrecognized villages face even greater hardship; they are poorer, 
denied all forms of basic services and infrastructure, and are unable to 
build or develop their communities.36 Several reports show that 
recognized Bedouin towns ranked lowest on Israel’s socio-economic 
scale.37 For instance, family income in Bedouin towns is less than half 
of an average family in the nearest Jewish city, Be’er Sheva.38 
Moreover, as a stark example of how Bedouins are deprived services, 
Bedouin towns are allocated only twenty-five to fifty percent of the 
amount of water allocated to Jewish towns.39 Bedouin towns contain 
more pupils per classroom than Jewish towns and have fewer paved 
roads.40 Overall, Israeli government agencies provide the Bedouin with 
wholly inadequate services when compared to the services given to 
Jewish towns. 
The striking differences in the respective treatment of Jews and 
Bedouins prompts suspicion that the policy is deliberately 
discriminatory.  For example, even recently, only seven out of the 
eighteen Bedouin towns gained the opportunity to elect their local 
representatives—the remaining eleven towns still have government 
appointed councils.  Somewhat encouragingly, the last two Israeli 
                                                          
36.  See generally Suleiman Abu-Bader & Daniel Gottlieb, Poverty, Education 
and Employment in the Arab-Bedouin Society: A Comparative View (SOC’Y FOR THE 
STUDY OF ECON. INEQUALITY, Working Paper No. 137, 2009), 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/inq/inqwps/ecineq2009-137.html (“The poorest group 
according to the poverty incidence is that of the Bedouin in non-recognized 
villages.”). 
37.  See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 15, at 59. 
38.  See Arik Rudnitzky & Thabet Abu Ras, The Bedouin Population in the 
Negev: Social, Demographic and Economic Factors, THE ABRAHAM FUND 
INITIATIVE, at 31 (2012). 
39.  Harvey Lithwick, Making the Bedouin Towns Work, THE CTR. FOR SOC. 
POL’Y STUD. IN ISRAEL 4-5 (June 2002); see also Abu-Bader & Gottlieb, supra note 
37, at 4.  
40.  See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 15, at 57. 
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governments have created programs to improve the Bedouin’s 
situation.  However, the fact remains that Bedouins living in Jewish 
regional councils like Bni-Shimom and Ramat-Hovav41 are still 
precluded from participating in local elections.42 
III. DISPOSSESSION OF BEDOUINS FROM THEIR LAND 
Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the 
government has systematically dispossessed Bedouins of their lands.  
The entire State government has executed and supported this process, 
but most activity has been conducted on three levels: (a) the executive, 
(b) the legislative, and (c) the judicial. 
A. Executive Level 
On the executive level, the State employed several administrative 
methods to dispossess Bedouins of their land.  The executive branch 
routinely employed traditional methods such as: (1) evicting the 
Bedouin from their land to neighboring states, (2) displacing the 
remaining Bedouin from their land to other parts of the State, and (3) 
concentrating Bedouins in a small area called the Siyag. 
In addition to the large amount of land confiscated or dispossessed, 
the “eviction and concentration” policy also affected the legal status of 
Bedouin land.43 The policy enabled additional state acts to separate the 
Bedouin from their land and confiscate it.  The state justified the policy 
by declaring the land as mawat land—as unpossessed, or unused, by the 
land owners for a long enough time. 
                                                          
41.  Bni-Shimom and Ramat-Hovav are Jewish regional councils that include 
many Bedouin populations who live in villages located in the jurisdictional area of 
these councils. However, despite living in the regional councils, the Bedouin are 
deprived of their basic rights since they are not considered residents of the councils. 
See Rudnitzky & Abu Ras, supra note 38, at 16. 
42.  See generally Shlomo Swirski, Current Plans for Developing the Negev: A 
Critical Perspective, ADVA CENTER, at 4 (2007). 
43.  Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 43 (such acts of 
dispossession and concentration disconnected the Bedouin from their land, enabling 
the application of some laws that deny land rights for those who are not in a physical 
possession of their land). 
9
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B. Legislative Level 
On the legislative level, the State enacted several laws that also 
dispossessed Bedouins of their land.  Two noteworthy laws are the Land 
Settlement Ordinance of 1969 and The Negev Land Acquisition (Peace 
Treaty with Egypt) of 1980.44 
The Land Settlement Ordinance of 1969 is considered the most 
important one for Bedouin land rights.  Not only did the ordinance 
dispossess many Bedouin of their land, but it also created a special legal 
regime with a specific process for land-title settlement.45 For example, 
procedurally, the ordinance transforms the status of Bedouin land from 
“owned land” to “claimed land,” and the Bedouin from “owners of their 
land” to “claimants of land.”46  Although only procedural, these 
changes tremendously affect Bedouin land rights because they shift the 
burden of proof from the State to the Bedouin.47 
The Negev Land Acquisition of 1980 is another statute that 
dispossesses Bedouins of their land.48 This law was specifically enacted 
to authorize the State of Israel to evict the Bedouin from their traditional 
villages in Tal-Almalah and to confiscate their land.49 In addition, the 
law established a new discriminatory system of compensation, which 
the State has used since 1980 to evict Bedouin land claimants.50 
C. Judicial Level 
On the judicial level, research shows the Bedouin cannot use the 
judicial system to defend their land rights.51 Instead, the judiciary has 
followed the will of the political leadership—a leadership opposing 
Bedouin land rights.  As a result of a complex and corrupt judiciary 
                                                          
44.  Arab Ass’n for Hum. Rts. Fact-Sheet on the Naqab (Negev), supra note 10. 
45.  Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 57. 
46.  Id. at 60. 
47.  Procedural changes can impact substantive rights. See generally Thomas O. 
Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 
(2010). 
48.  Ghazi Falah, Israeli State Policy toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the 
Negev, 18 J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 71, 80 (1989). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  See generally Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 95. 
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process, the Bedouin face many obstacles in prevailing with their land 
disputes.  For instance, courts have refused to recognize Bedouin land 
rights based on Bedouin customary law.52 Procedurally, courts have 
rejected traditional Bedouin evidence53 and have instead required 
unobtainable evidence, such as proof of their land use dating back to 
the 1930s. 
Bedouins have found the only way for courts to recognize their land 
ownership under Israeli law is by following the State law through its 
legal system and attempting to prove they have revived mawat land.54 
Here, the Bedouin’s main challenge has been to prove their land 
ownership according to a different legal system and culture of land use.  
Namely, Israeli courts require land ownership proof based on western 
permanent settlement farming rather than on grazing, which is 
traditionally how Bedouins used their land.55 
Israeli courts have established requirements that render it 
impossible for Bedouins to gain legal recognition of their land rights.56 
This conclusion is shared by many legal scholars, including Professor 
David Kretzmer, but first and foremost by the Israeli Supreme Court 
Justice, Abraham Halima.  Justice Halima, in Salim Alhawashelah v. 
State of Israel, wrote the definitive decision regarding Bedouin land 
rights in 1984.57 
1. The Alhawashelah Precedent in the High Court 
In Alhawashelah, Beduoin Alhawashelah tribe members claimed 
they owned the land in dispute.  The State countered that Bedouin land 
                                                          
52.  Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 55. 
53.  Id. at 19 (courts rejected evidence such as traditional land ownership 
contracts, and other documents called Sanadat that prove their land rights).  
54.  Id. at 71 (mawat land is defined as “a land that is remote from an inhabited 
place, not possessed or inhabited by anybody”). 
55.  Tawfiq S. Rangwala, Inadequate Housing, Israel, and the Bedouin of the 
Negev, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 415, 440 (2004) (stating “[a]lthough Israeli courts 
recognized that Bedouin had been living on the lands, they would not recognize tents 
as settlements. Furthermore, the courts denied that pastoralism as practiced by the 
Bedouin constituted ‘working’ the land.”); Stavenhagen and Amara, supra note 14, at 
86 (Israeli courts required a higher standard of proof for demonstrating cultivation). 
56.  Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 356 (citing CA 218/74 Salim 
Alhawashelah v. State of Israel 38(3)PD 141 (1974) (Isr.)). 
57.  Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 68. 
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was mawat land under the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, which defined 
mawat land as “land that is remote from an inhabited place, not 
allocated or possessed by anybody.”58 To win their case and acquire 
land ownership rights, Bedouins had to prove they had “revived mawat 
land,”59 and that they had obtained permission to do so from the 
Ottoman or the British Mandate authorities.60 Ultimately, the Court 
accepted the State’s arguments and decided that Alhawashelah land was 
mawat land; therefore, rejecting the Bedouin’s claims and denying their 
appeal.61 All subsequent Bedouin land cases followed the 
Alhawashelah precedent.62 To this day, the Bedouin have not won a 
single land claim case. 
From an international human rights perspective, the Alhawashelah 
decision is a travesty of justice—denying ancestral land rights to all 
Bedouins. 
IV. PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS LAND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law protects indigenous peoples’ land rights under: 
(1) the International Labor Organization No. 169 (ILO);63 (2) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);64 and (3) 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
                                                          
58.  Id. at 71. 
59.  To revive Mawat land means to turn it into productive and usable land, 
usually through consistent use. See Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 350 
n.85. 
60.  SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 15, at 13-14. 
61.  Id. at 26-27. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Indigenous Peoples Tribal Convention art. 5, Sept. 5, 1991, I.L.O No. C169; 
see S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1991). 
64.  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966). The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes 
several important provisions that protect, although indirectly, the land rights of 
indigenous peoples. Namely, articles 17, 23, and 27 of the Covenant have proven to 
protect land rights in several cases; see generally Martin Scheinin, Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
ABORIGINAL POL’Y RES. CONSORTIUM INT’L, 1-18 (2004). 
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Discrimination (ICERD).65 However, the Bedouin cannot benefit from 
these protections because Israeli courts do not recognize the 
applicability of these international laws.66 
A. The Limitations of International Human Rights Law in Israel 
As the Bedouins discovered, there are many limitations in applying 
international human rights laws to and within Israel.  For instance, 
“Individual communications” under the ICCPR’s First Optional 
Protocol67 and the ability to make complaints to the CERD are not 
available to the Bedouin.68 Further, Israel has not ratified the ILO 
Convention No. 169, which is the main international means of 
vouchsafing indigenous people’s rights.69 
Additionally, Israel is not a member of any regional system 
designed to safeguard human rights, such as the European system 
(embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights) or the Inter-
                                                          
65.  G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) Annex, International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965). The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also includes provisions 
that protect indigenous social, economic, and cultural rights. The Convention may 
consider individual complaints of state parties who recognize the competence of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under Article 14 of the 
Convention, making it an effective and practical method for rights recognition. 
Further, the fact that racial discrimination is one of the main causes of marginalization 
and rights deprivation of indigenous communities makes the Convention very relevant 
to their struggle. Lorenzo Nesti, Mapuche-Pehuenche and the Ralco Dam on the 
Biobio River: The Challenge of Protecting Indigenous Land Rights, 9 INT’L J. ON 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1, 37 (2002). 
66.  Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 9, 123. 
67.  The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR authorizes the Human Rights 
Committee to receive complaints from individuals in countries that are party to the 
ICCPR that have signed the First Optional Protocol. See generally G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Mar. 23, 1976); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 253 (2004) (discussing individual communication generally). 
68.  They are not available either because Israel is not party to the relevant 
convention, such as the ILO Convention, or because it has restricted the use of such 
procedures by making reservations to certain provisions, such as Israel’s reservation 
from the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, or by abstaining from making the 
Special Declaration recognizing the competence of CERD. See Elsana, Dispossession 
and Recognition, supra note 5, at 126-27. 
69.  Id. at 127-28. 
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American Human Rights System.  Thus, there is little, if any, 
international protection of Bedouin human rights in Israel, which means 
international protection of Bedouin land rights is virtually nonexistent. 
B. The Bedouin Situation and the Need for a Different Approach 
As mentioned above, Bedouin litigation experience and the 
opinions of leading legal scholars like Justice Halima and Kretzmer 
demonstrate that further judicial action by the Bedouin would prove 
futile.  Israeli courts will never recognize Bedouin land rights.70 
Considering the failure of both Israeli national law and 
international law to protect Bedouin land rights, this article proposes 
alternative solutions for facilitating Bedouin land recognition in Israel 
by comparing the application of customary law to indigenous peoples 
around the globe. 
It is well-known that disputes over indigenous peoples’ land rights 
are not unique to the Bedouin in Israel.  Many studies show the issue is 
common in many parts of the world, especially in places where colonial 
powers encountered indigenous peoples.71 Among the prominent 
examples are the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Nicaragua. 
Unlike Israel, many countries have established ways of recognizing 
indigenous land rights.  For instance, New Zealand, Canada, and 
Australia have established administrative and legal mechanisms, 
including committees and tribunals, to address the issue.72 In recent 
decades, the courts of these countries have published several precedent-
setting judgments recognizing indigenous land rights.73 
                                                          
70.  See generally MADDRELL, supra note 9, at 8. 
71.  Birgitte Feiring, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Territories, and 
Resources, INTERNATIONAL LAND COALITION 43 (2009) 
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/IndigenousPeo
plesRightsLandTerritoriesResources.pdf).  
72.  See, e.g., Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s 
Unrecognized Bedouin Villages, HUM. RTS. WATCH 104-105 (2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/iopt0308/iopt0308webwcover.pdf. 
73.  See id. 
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1. New Zealand and Australia 
In 1975, the New Zealand Parliament established a permanent 
council and a special court for the land of the Maori People (Waitangi 
Tribunal).74 This mechanism settled many land claims filed by 
indigenous people and returned many lands to their original Maori 
owners.75 In some cases, where the state could not return the land, the 
court ordered the government to pay compensation to the indigenous 
Maori. 76 
In Australia, after a long struggle by the Meriam aboriginal people, 
in the famous precedent of Mabo v. Queensland,77 the High Court 
recognized the indigenous peoples’ land ownership and possession.78 
2. Canada 
In 1991, following the protests of indigenous Canadians, the 
government appointed a committee to examine the indigenous peoples’ 
rights.  In 1996, the Commission published a report79 recommending 
sweeping legislative changes establishing new institutions and creating 
additional resources to redistribute land and reconstruct the 
governments of indigenous peoples.  In Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, the court accepted indigenous peoples’ ownership claims as 
to several areas covering 58,000 square kilometers in northwest British 
Columbia.81F80 
While these examples show that many countries solved similar 
indigenous peoples’ land rights issues, their importance lies in the 
various ways they solved these land disputes.  This article examines 
                                                          
74.  Alan Ward, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand Law and Politics, 92 
JOURNAL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES OCÉANISTES 89, 89-91 (1991). 
75.  Treaty of Waitangi: Treaty Timeline – Treaty Events Since 1950, NEW 
ZEALAND HIST.,  https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/treaty/treaty-timeline/treaty-
events-1950 (last updated May 17, 2017).  
76.  Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized 
Bedouin Villages, supra note 72, at 104-105. 
77.  Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.).   
78.  Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 46. 
79.  Highlights from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
Canada.ca (1996), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/ 
1100100014637. 
80.  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.). 
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these dominant methods of securing indigenous people’s rights 
recognition in land disputes. 
C. An Approach Based on Customary Law 
There are several approaches to recognize indigenous rights.  One 
dominant approach—based on customary law—is becoming common 
in many countries around the world.  For example, in Latin America 
“[m]any . . . countries are accepting the premise that traditional legal 
systems have a rightful place within the modern state.”81 
As Tobin notes, “[t]he widespread recognition of native title 
demonstrate[s] a clear state practice of recognizing customary law as 
the basis for the identification and adjudication of IP land rights.”82 In 
this regard, John Borrows adds, “[t]hese designations illustrate that 
Canadian law dealing with Aboriginal peoples draws upon First 
Nations law in giving meaning to the content of Aboriginal rights.”83 
In Australia, the recognition of indigenous rights also relied on 
customary law.  In Mabo v. Queensland, the court relied on indigenous 
customary law to recognize a source for indigenous property rights.84 
There, the court created a new legal doctrine in property law called 
Native Title.85 Notably, the new doctrine of Native Title—which is 
primarily based on land rights under indigenous customary law—the 
Australian court was able to recognize the indigenous peoples’ land 
rights that they enjoyed prior to the discovery of Australia. 87F86 The Mabo 
                                                          
81.  MICHÈLE SCHMIEGELOW & HENRIK SCHMIEGELOW, INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETITION BETWEEN COMMON L. AND CIV. L.: THEORY AND POL’Y 241 (2014). 
82.  BRENDAN TOBIN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CUSTOMARY L. AND HUM. RTS. – 
WHY LIVING L. MATTERS 113 (2014).  
83.  John Borrows, With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada), 41 
MCGILL L. J. 629, 636 (1996). 
84.  See generally Noel Pearson, The Concept of Native Title at Common Law, 
AUSTRALIAN HUM. REV. (Mar. 1997). 
85.  Although some land rights were recognized in a few states in Australia prior 
to Mabo (No. 2), the decision introduced for the first time judicial recognition of 
Aboriginal land rights. See Garth Nettheim, Mabo and Legal Pluralism: The 
Australian Aboriginal Justice Experience in LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE COLONIAL 
LEGACY 103, 106 (Kayleen M. Hazlehurst ed. 1995). 
86.  PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE 
AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM 257 (2006). 
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decision recognized the Aboriginal customary law as legitimate and 
regarded Aboriginal customary law as a legal source of land rights.87 
1. The Richtersveld Case in South Africa 
Recognizing customary law as a basis for indigenous rights has 
become a global phenomenon.88 Many countries have adopted this 
approach in recognizing indigenous peoples’ land rights.  For example, 
in South Africa, courts relied on the customary law of the local 
community to recognize traditional land rights.89 In the well-known 
decision Richtersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd, the court accepted the 
community’s appeal based on interests under customary law.90 The 
court also decided the Richtersveld community had land rights based 
on their customary law.91 The court added that “an interest in land held 
under a system of indigenous law is thus expressly recognized as a 
‘right in land,’ whether or not it was recognized by civil law as a legal 
right.”93 F92 
2. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case in Nicaragua 
In 2001, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights recognized indigenous land rights 
according to their customary law.93 The case establishes indigenous 
                                                          
87.  Jérémie Gilbert, Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land Claims: A 
Comparative and International Approach to the Common Law Doctrine on 
Indigenous Title, 56 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 583, 591 (2007). See generally Nettheim, 
supra note 85, at 106. 
88.  JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RTS. UNDER INT’L L.: 
FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS  66 (1st ed. 2006). 
89.  See Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa’s Treatment of 
Witchcraft Says for the Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62-
110 (2003). 
90.  Yvette Trahan, The Richtersveld Community & Others v. Alexkor Ltd.: 
Declaration of a “Right in Land” Through a Customary Law Interest Sets Stage for 
Introduction of Aboriginal Title into South African Legal System, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 565, 567 (2004). 
91.  Id. 
92.  Richtersveld Cmty. & Others v. Alexkor Ltd. & Another, Case No. 488/01, 
BCLR, Supreme Court of Appeal, ¶ 9 (Mar. 24, 2003). 
93.  S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, 
Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist 
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peoples’ customary law as a necessary basis for the recognition of 
indigenous rights on the international level (regional-international 
level).94 There, the court acknowledged indigenous peoples’ rights 
mainly based on customary law.95 
The court further ruled that the right to property also included 
indigenous peoples’ land rights and the protection of their traditional 
land.96 The court also noted that under Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights97 the right to property also includes 
property rights held collectively by indigenous groups under customary 
law.98 Accordingly, this decision also recognizes customary law of the 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni as a source of land rights.99 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, these cases—around the world—show a clear practice 
of recognizing indigenous land rights through or based on customary 
law.  Moreover, the common denominator for recognizing indigenous 
rights—in all cases—is according to indigenous peoples’ customary 
law.  Courts from countries around the world have recognized 
indigenous rights according to specific indigenous peoples’ customary 
laws. 
                                                          
Trend, COLO. J. OF INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 237, 252 (2005), 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2181&context=articles; 
Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 5, at 188. 
94.  Jennifer A. Amiott, Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples’ Land 
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous 
Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873, 878-79 (2002).  
95.  Anaya, supra note 93, at 253. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, 
art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
98.  The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 
August 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 164 (2001). 
99.  See Organization of American States, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ 
Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
ODA/Ser.L./V/II., doc. 56/09, ch. V-VI (Dec. 30, 2009), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/ancestrallands.pdf; Andres E. 
Montalvo, Reservations to the American Convention on Human Rights: A New 
Approach, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 269-313 (2001); Off the Map: Land and Housing 
Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized Bedouin Villages, supra note 72, at 104-
05. 
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Although history provides little doubt that the search for Bedouin 
land rights in Israeli law or in Ottoman law will not succeed, Bedouin 
land rights can plausibly be found in Bedouin customary law.  Thus, by 
recognizing these land rights established through Bedouin customary 
law, the State of Israel—like other countries—can find a basis for 
granting true recognition of Bedouin traditional land rights. 
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